{"id":10890,"date":"2026-03-10T22:17:22","date_gmt":"2026-03-10T20:17:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/o.wdmadani.net\/?p=10890"},"modified":"2026-03-10T22:17:22","modified_gmt":"2026-03-10T20:17:22","slug":"sudanese-islamists-and-the-war-on-iran-regional-repercussions-for-the-internal-conflict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/o.wdmadani.net\/?p=10890","title":{"rendered":"Sudanese Islamists And The War On Iran: Regional Repercussions For The Internal Conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"pvc_clear\"><\/div>\n<p id=\"pvc_stats_10890\" class=\"pvc_stats total_only  \" data-element-id=\"10890\" style=\"\"><i class=\"pvc-stats-icon small\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" version=\"1.0\" viewBox=\"0 0 502 315\" preserveAspectRatio=\"xMidYMid meet\"><g transform=\"translate(0,332) scale(0.1,-0.1)\" fill=\"\" stroke=\"none\"><path d=\"M2394 3279 l-29 -30 -3 -207 c-2 -182 0 -211 15 -242 39 -76 157 -76 196 0 15 31 17 60 15 243 l-3 209 -33 29 c-26 23 -41 29 -80 29 -41 0 -53 -5 -78 -31z\"\/><path d=\"M3085 3251 c-45 -19 -58 -50 -96 -229 -47 -217 -49 -260 -13 -295 52 -53 146 -42 177 20 16 31 87 366 87 410 0 70 -86 122 -155 94z\"\/><path d=\"M1751 3234 c-13 -9 -29 -31 -37 -50 -12 -29 -10 -49 21 -204 19 -94 39 -189 45 -210 14 -50 54 -80 110 -80 34 0 48 6 76 34 21 21 34 44 34 59 0 14 -18 113 -40 219 -37 178 -43 195 -70 221 -36 32 -101 37 -139 11z\"\/><path d=\"M1163 3073 c-36 -7 -73 -59 -73 -102 0 -56 133 -378 171 -413 34 -32 83 -37 129 -13 70 36 67 87 -16 290 -86 209 -89 214 -129 231 -35 14 -42 15 -82 7z\"\/><path d=\"M3689 3066 c-15 -9 -33 -30 -42 -48 -48 -103 -147 -355 -147 -375 0 -98 131 -148 192 -74 13 15 57 108 97 206 80 196 84 226 37 273 -30 30 -99 39 -137 18z\"\/><path d=\"M583 2784 c-38 -19 -67 -74 -58 -113 9 -42 211 -354 242 -373 16 -10 45 -18 66 -18 51 0 107 52 107 100 0 39 -1 41 -124 234 -80 126 -108 162 -133 173 -41 17 -61 16 -100 -3z\"\/><path d=\"M4250 2784 c-14 -9 -74 -91 -133 -183 -95 -150 -107 -173 -107 -213 0 -55 33 -94 87 -104 67 -13 90 8 211 198 130 202 137 225 78 284 -27 27 -42 34 -72 34 -22 0 -50 -8 -64 -16z\"\/><path d=\"M2275 2693 c-553 -48 -1095 -270 -1585 -649 -135 -104 -459 -423 -483 -476 -23 -49 -22 -139 2 -186 73 -142 361 -457 571 -626 285 -228 642 -407 990 -497 242 -63 336 -73 660 -74 310 0 370 5 595 52 535 111 1045 392 1455 803 122 121 250 273 275 326 19 41 19 137 0 174 -41 79 -309 363 -465 492 -447 370 -946 591 -1479 653 -113 14 -422 18 -536 8z m395 -428 c171 -34 330 -124 456 -258 112 -119 167 -219 211 -378 27 -96 24 -300 -5 -401 -72 -255 -236 -447 -474 -557 -132 -62 -201 -76 -368 -76 -167 0 -236 14 -368 76 -213 98 -373 271 -451 485 -162 444 86 934 547 1084 153 49 292 57 452 25z m909 -232 c222 -123 408 -262 593 -441 76 -74 138 -139 138 -144 0 -16 -233 -242 -330 -319 -155 -123 -309 -223 -461 -299 l-81 -41 32 46 c18 26 49 83 70 128 143 306 141 649 -6 957 -25 52 -61 116 -79 142 l-34 47 45 -20 c26 -10 76 -36 113 -56z m-2057 25 c-40 -58 -105 -190 -130 -263 -110 -324 -59 -707 132 -981 25 -35 42 -64 37 -64 -19 0 -241 119 -326 174 -188 122 -406 314 -532 468 l-58 71 108 103 c185 178 428 349 672 473 66 33 121 60 123 61 2 0 -10 -19 -26 -42z\"\/><path d=\"M2375 1950 c-198 -44 -350 -190 -395 -379 -18 -76 -8 -221 19 -290 114 -284 457 -406 731 -260 98 52 188 154 231 260 27 69 37 214 19 290 -38 163 -166 304 -326 360 -67 23 -215 33 -279 19z\"\/><\/g><\/svg><\/i> <img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"16\" height=\"16\" alt=\"Loading\" src=\"https:\/\/o.wdmadani.net\/wp-content\/plugins\/page-views-count\/ajax-loader-2x.gif\" border=0 \/><\/p>\n<div class=\"pvc_clear\"><\/div>\n<div>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\"><strong>Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman \u2013 African Affairs Unit \u2013 Progress Center for Policies \u2013 London<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\">Introduction<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\">The announcement by the majority of political Islamist currents in Sudan expressing support for the Iranian regime in the ongoing war against what they describe as Israeli aggression coincided with statements from some jihadist factions declaring their readiness to participate in the fighting. This development comes at a particularly complex moment for Sudan, as the country continues to endure a prolonged internal war. These positions raise questions about their potential impact on the balance of power within Sudan\u2019s internal conflict and on Sudan\u2019s regional standing at a time when the Middle East is witnessing a broad military escalation.<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\">The significance of these statements lies in the fact that they reflect an attempt by Sudanese Islamist forces to reposition themselves politically within a regional environment marked by increasing polarization between an axis led by Iran and another led by the United States and Israel. These movements appear to be seeking to restore their political role after their influence declined following the fall of the regime of Omar al-Bashir, taking advantage of the ongoing internal conflict and the need of some components of the military authority to mobilize supportive social and political constituencies.<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\">The statements issued by Sudanese Islamist factions therefore appear primarily as an attempt at political repositioning within a tense regional context. At the same time, they carry potential implications for power balances within Sudan and for the military government\u2019s relations with its regional and international environment. The actual impact of these statements will depend largely on whether the military establishment adopts this rhetoric or instead seeks to confine it to the realm of political mobilization without turning it into official state policy.<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\"><strong>Key Developments<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Al-Naji Abdullah, known as the \u201cCommander of the Mujahideen,\u201d one of the leaders of brigades allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces, declared during a Ramadan jihadist iftar gathering their readiness to fight alongside Iran in the event of a ground intervention by the United States and Israel. He called for opening the borders for that purpose. He also expressed support for Iran in the ongoing war, stating that their rifles and artillery were ready and that they possess advanced generations of drones. He stressed that they do not recognize the United Nations, the Security Council, or regional organizations. He added that Sudan is a country of jihad and struggle and would not allow the return of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), changes to educational curricula, or attacks on the Islamic approach.<\/li>\n<li>The Sudanese Islamic Movement, led by Ali Karti, stated that what the region is witnessing is part of a broader project aimed at weakening the Islamic world and fragmenting its unity. In a statement, it condemned all forms of aggression against Arab and Islamic countries, violations of sovereignty, and attacks on civilians. At the same time, it stressed that its priority is defending Sudan and its people against current challenges. The movement emphasized that its official positions are issued only by its leadership and that statements to the contrary do not represent it\u2014an implicit reference to the statements by the \u201cCommander of the Mujahideen\u201d supporting Iran.<\/li>\n<li>In contrast, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, threatened decisive action against groups that declared readiness to defend Iran in its war against Gulf states, stressing that the armed forces stand against such groups and against anyone who supports or encourages aggression against the Arab Gulf countries.<\/li>\n<li>The official spokesperson for the Sudanese army denied that the jihadist groups expressing support for Iran or readiness to participate in the war belong to the armed forces, confirming that legal measures will be taken against them.<\/li>\n<li>At the diplomatic level, Sudan\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained its critical stance toward the United Arab Emirates, despite condemning the attack, by excluding the UAE from the solidarity statement issued for the other Gulf states. This partial approach reflects an attempt to exploit the incident to reaffirm the ongoing hostility between the two sides. It can also be interpreted in the context of convergence with the statement issued by the Islamic Movement\u2014the political incubator\u2014which condemned the American and Israeli attacks on Iran while avoiding reference to the targeting of Gulf states.<br \/>Analysis<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Islamist movements of various currents interpret the military developments in the region within the framework of a broader struggle over Islamic identity and a perceived threat to the survival of their political systems. This is not only due to the potential loss of military and technical support but also because the Islamic Republic of Iran represents, both morally and materially, the contemporary model that inspired their own early experience in governance.<br \/>At the same time, the internal reality in Sudan\u2014marked by fragmentation and the severe humanitarian and political crisis caused by the ongoing war\u2014along with developments in the war involving Iran, has compelled Islamist factions supporting the army to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. They appear aware that any explicit alignment with Iran would impose military and diplomatic costs far beyond the country\u2019s capabilities.<br \/>Moreover, adopting a position of neutrality would require the presence of a legitimate government enjoying broad public consensus capable of protecting national interests. Such legitimacy has been lacking since these Islamist currents were removed from power by a popular uprising, a development that later contributed to the coup against the transitional government and the outbreak of the current war.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"790\" height=\"407\" src=\"https:\/\/alsudania.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/\u0627\u0644\u0628\u0631\u0647\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0627\u0644\u0643\u064a\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0627\u0646-d66f5406e91e-2-2.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-16254\" srcset=\"https:\/\/alsudania.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/\u0627\u0644\u0628\u0631\u0647\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0627\u0644\u0643\u064a\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0627\u0646-d66f5406e91e-2-2.jpg 790w, https:\/\/alsudania.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/\u0627\u0644\u0628\u0631\u0647\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0627\u0644\u0643\u064a\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0627\u0646-d66f5406e91e-2-2-300x155.jpg 300w, https:\/\/alsudania.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/\u0627\u0644\u0628\u0631\u0647\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0627\u0644\u0643\u064a\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0627\u0646-d66f5406e91e-2-2-768x396.jpg 768w, https:\/\/alsudania.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/\u0627\u0644\u0628\u0631\u0647\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0627\u0644\u0643\u064a\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0627\u0646-d66f5406e91e-2-2-696x359.jpg 696w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 790px) 100vw, 790px\"><\/figure>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\">The differing positions within Sudan\u2019s wartime camp regarding the conflict between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other reveal a state of confusion and division within the forces supporting the continuation of the war and their political base in Port Sudan.<br \/>This divergence essentially reflects competing tendencies within the same camp. One faction leans toward supporting Iran on religious grounds and because of its role as a major ally and supporter in Sudan\u2019s current war. Another faction prefers alignment with the Gulf axis based on regional calculations and political interests related to Sudan\u2019s external relations. Meanwhile, a third tendency seeks to adopt a middle position that condemns both sides while avoiding clear alignment with either\u2014an approach associated with partners in power, including the army leadership, Islamist groups, and armed movements.<br \/>Conversely, analysts and experts estimate that the Sudanese government led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan could be among the biggest losers if Iran were to lose the war, given the loss of a significant strategic ally and supporter. Some analysts expect that such an outcome could push Sudan back toward negotiations through the initiative of the Quad Mechanism. If the Iranian regime survives and endures, however, the situation in Sudan may not change significantly, with the likely continuation of the war, the rejection of the Quad initiative, and the transformation of Sudan into a theater of proxy conflict.<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\">Conclusions and Assessments<br \/>The war in Sudan has become heavily influenced by Gulf dynamics and regional rivalries. The Iran\u2013Israel\u2013United States conflict could also affect the external logistical support received by the parties to the Sudanese conflict, potentially giving one side a logistical advantage or complicating the ability of both sides to secure such support.<br \/>Regional and international attention to efforts aimed at ending the war in Sudan may decline as the Iranian-American-Israeli conflict dominates the regional agenda, particularly given the direct involvement of three members of the Quad Mechanism initiative\u2014the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the United States\u2014in the ongoing confrontation.<br \/>The differing positions regarding the war between Iran and the United States and Israel reveal fractures within the coalition supporting the continuation of the war in Sudan. They point to the absence of a unified stance and the existence of multiple centers of influence and decision-making within the pro-war camp, reflecting a decline in political cohesion among its components.<br \/>At the same time, these developments\u2014according to the saying \u201cevery cloud has a silver lining\u201d\u2014may open the door to regional consensus around a political solution in Sudan. Such an opportunity could be seized by Sudanese political and military forces to end the war and preserve the country\u2019s unity.<\/p>\n<p>\u0638\u0647\u0631\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0642\u0627\u0644\u0629 <a href=\"https:\/\/alsudania.news\/sudanese-islamists-and-the-war-on-iran-regional-repercussions-for-the-internal-conflict\/\">Sudanese Islamists And The War On Iran: Regional Repercussions For The Internal Conflict<\/a> \u0623\u0648\u0644\u0627\u064b \u0639\u0644\u0649 <a href=\"https:\/\/alsudania.news\/\">\u0627\u0644\u0633\u0648\u062f\u0627\u0646\u064a\u0629 \u0646\u064a\u0648\u0632<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<div class=\"pvc_clear\"><\/div>\n<p id=\"pvc_stats_10890\" class=\"pvc_stats total_only  \" data-element-id=\"10890\" style=\"\"><i class=\"pvc-stats-icon small\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" version=\"1.0\" viewBox=\"0 0 502 315\" preserveAspectRatio=\"xMidYMid meet\"><g transform=\"translate(0,332) scale(0.1,-0.1)\" fill=\"\" stroke=\"none\"><path d=\"M2394 3279 l-29 -30 -3 -207 c-2 -182 0 -211 15 -242 39 -76 157 -76 196 0 15 31 17 60 15 243 l-3 209 -33 29 c-26 23 -41 29 -80 29 -41 0 -53 -5 -78 -31z\"\/><path d=\"M3085 3251 c-45 -19 -58 -50 -96 -229 -47 -217 -49 -260 -13 -295 52 -53 146 -42 177 20 16 31 87 366 87 410 0 70 -86 122 -155 94z\"\/><path d=\"M1751 3234 c-13 -9 -29 -31 -37 -50 -12 -29 -10 -49 21 -204 19 -94 39 -189 45 -210 14 -50 54 -80 110 -80 34 0 48 6 76 34 21 21 34 44 34 59 0 14 -18 113 -40 219 -37 178 -43 195 -70 221 -36 32 -101 37 -139 11z\"\/><path d=\"M1163 3073 c-36 -7 -73 -59 -73 -102 0 -56 133 -378 171 -413 34 -32 83 -37 129 -13 70 36 67 87 -16 290 -86 209 -89 214 -129 231 -35 14 -42 15 -82 7z\"\/><path d=\"M3689 3066 c-15 -9 -33 -30 -42 -48 -48 -103 -147 -355 -147 -375 0 -98 131 -148 192 -74 13 15 57 108 97 206 80 196 84 226 37 273 -30 30 -99 39 -137 18z\"\/><path d=\"M583 2784 c-38 -19 -67 -74 -58 -113 9 -42 211 -354 242 -373 16 -10 45 -18 66 -18 51 0 107 52 107 100 0 39 -1 41 -124 234 -80 126 -108 162 -133 173 -41 17 -61 16 -100 -3z\"\/><path d=\"M4250 2784 c-14 -9 -74 -91 -133 -183 -95 -150 -107 -173 -107 -213 0 -55 33 -94 87 -104 67 -13 90 8 211 198 130 202 137 225 78 284 -27 27 -42 34 -72 34 -22 0 -50 -8 -64 -16z\"\/><path d=\"M2275 2693 c-553 -48 -1095 -270 -1585 -649 -135 -104 -459 -423 -483 -476 -23 -49 -22 -139 2 -186 73 -142 361 -457 571 -626 285 -228 642 -407 990 -497 242 -63 336 -73 660 -74 310 0 370 5 595 52 535 111 1045 392 1455 803 122 121 250 273 275 326 19 41 19 137 0 174 -41 79 -309 363 -465 492 -447 370 -946 591 -1479 653 -113 14 -422 18 -536 8z m395 -428 c171 -34 330 -124 456 -258 112 -119 167 -219 211 -378 27 -96 24 -300 -5 -401 -72 -255 -236 -447 -474 -557 -132 -62 -201 -76 -368 -76 -167 0 -236 14 -368 76 -213 98 -373 271 -451 485 -162 444 86 934 547 1084 153 49 292 57 452 25z m909 -232 c222 -123 408 -262 593 -441 76 -74 138 -139 138 -144 0 -16 -233 -242 -330 -319 -155 -123 -309 -223 -461 -299 l-81 -41 32 46 c18 26 49 83 70 128 143 306 141 649 -6 957 -25 52 -61 116 -79 142 l-34 47 45 -20 c26 -10 76 -36 113 -56z m-2057 25 c-40 -58 -105 -190 -130 -263 -110 -324 -59 -707 132 -981 25 -35 42 -64 37 -64 -19 0 -241 119 -326 174 -188 122 -406 314 -532 468 l-58 71 108 103 c185 178 428 349 672 473 66 33 121 60 123 61 2 0 -10 -19 -26 -42z\"\/><path d=\"M2375 1950 c-198 -44 -350 -190 -395 -379 -18 -76 -8 -221 19 -290 114 -284 457 -406 731 -260 98 52 188 154 231 260 27 69 37 214 19 290 -38 163 -166 304 -326 360 -67 23 -215 33 -279 19z\"\/><\/g><\/svg><\/i> <img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"16\" height=\"16\" alt=\"Loading\" src=\"https:\/\/o.wdmadani.net\/wp-content\/plugins\/page-views-count\/ajax-loader-2x.gif\" border=0 \/><\/p>\n<div class=\"pvc_clear\"><\/div>\n<p>Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman \u2013 African Affairs Unit \u2013 Progress Center for Policies \u2013 London Introduction The announcement by&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":24,"featured_media":10891,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/alsudania.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/\u0627\u0644\u0628\u0631\u0647\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0627\u0644\u0643\u064a\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0632\u0627\u0646-d66f5406e91e-2-2.jpg","fifu_image_alt":"Sudanese Islamists And The War On Iran: Regional Repercussions For The Internal 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